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Why have many regional organizations adopted common markets and customs unions?
This article proposes a cognitive diffusion mechanism – termed frame diffusion – to
explain convergent institutional choices across structurally diverse settings. Using Strang
and Meyer’s (1993) notion of ‘theorization’ to combine foundational work on framing
with the literature on diffusion, I argue that processes of theorization transform the
experience of successful institutional innovators into abstract cognitive schemas, which
link a particular understanding of a cooperation problem to speciﬁc institutional
solutions. As policymakers in other contexts encounter similar cooperation problems,
they adopt framed institutional solutions, which results in institutional convergence at the
macro level. I further suggest that this process of frame diffusion is conditional on
ideational afﬁnities in social purpose between the innovating organization and other
regional organizations. Where other organizations pursue a distinct social purpose,
policymakers rely on alternative frames and thereby cement institutional variation. After
developing this argument theoretically, I illustrate it in an exploratory comparison of
institutional choice in three most different regional organizations: Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, Common Market of the South, and the Southern African
Development Community. The argument points to signiﬁcant ‘blind spots’ and
conceptual complementarity between prominent mechanisms of diffusion.
Keywords: regional organization; economic cooperation; institutional choice;
institutional convergence; diffusion; framing
International economic cooperation below the multilateral level has
become a staple feature of the world economy. Besides bilateral trade
agreements, an important part of this development occurs in the context
of regional organizations, many of which have come to endorse
ambitious objectives for economic cooperation such as common markets
and even economic unions since the early 1990s (Haftel 2013; Duina 2016).
Curiously, these decisions often mirror basic institutional choices of the
European Union (EU1), the most prominent and successful ‘institutional
pioneer’ of regional economic cooperation (Lenz and Burilkov 2017).
Consider three prominent regional organizations in the developing world:
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Common
Market of the South (Mercosur), and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). Whereas all three initially limited cooperation to
functional coordination of diverse policies, they now share the objective of
establishing a commonmarket that involves the free ﬂow of goods, services,
capital, and labor by gradually adopting additional legal instruments.
These converging institutional choices in regional economic cooperation
can be the result of (1) like, yet independent, reactions to similar structural
conditions, (2) external imposition by hegemonic actors, or (3) diffusion
(see Elkins and Simmons 2005, 35). In this article, I develop the third
explanation by proposing a cognitive mechanism of diffusion – termed
frame diffusion – to explain the adoption of similar common market
objectives in structurally diverse regional organizations.
Combining foundational work on framing (Goffman 1974; Snow and
Benford 1988) with the literature on diffusion in comparative politics and
international relations (Weyland 2005; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett
2006; Shipan and Volden 2008), I argue that processes of theorization
transform the experience of successful institutional innovators into abstract
cognitive schemas, which link a particular understanding of a cooperation
problem to speciﬁc institutional solutions. As policymakers in other
contexts encounter similar cooperation problems, they adopt framed
institutional solutions, independently of the wider material context in
which they are embedded. As a result, frame diffusion leads actors in
structurally diverse contexts and in the absence of outside imposition
towards similar institutional choices, which results in institutional
convergence at the macro level.
However, I also posit that this process of frame diffusion is conditional.
Frames retain ideational afﬁnities with the organizations in which they
originate, but theorization broadens this afﬁnity to extend to particular
organizational types, as deﬁned by their social purpose. As a result, speciﬁc
frames are seen as valuable in speciﬁc types of organizations. Where
policymakers pursue other social purposes, they rely on alternative frames
and thereby cement institutional variation rather than induce institutional
convergence. Regarding the empirical terrain of regional economic
cooperation, I juxtapose two distinct social purposes – community and
1 For the sake of simplicity, I use the acronym EU to refer to today’s EU as well as its
predecessor, the European Community.
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market building – and posit that the commonmarket frame is likely to diffuse
among regional organizations that share a community building purpose.
Overall, I argue that frame diffusion is necessary to understand the speciﬁc
form that institutional choices in international economic cooperation take.
This argument builds on, and extends, Strang and Meyer’s (1993)
ground-breaking idea that framing and diffusion arguments can be
successfully married. I further develop their argument by drawing explicitly
on the cognitive literature and by transferring it from the domestic to the
international level. The main theoretical contribution of the present article
is to develop a new cognitive mechanism that conceives frame-based
decision-making as a form of diffusion, thereby bringing the literatures on
framing and on diffusion into conversation with each other. Doing so has
distinct analytical advantages for both literatures. On one side, scholars of
diffusion have largely neglected the insights provided by the framing and
cognitive literatures, particularly the ‘channeled’ nature of much institu-
tional choice. In most diffusion arguments, the cognitive dimension remains
implicit and, where it is made explicit, it tends to be pitched as an alternative
to existing diffusion mechanisms (see, e.g., Weyland 2005; Poulsen 2014).
The argument advanced in the article, by contrast, suggests that explicating
this cognitive dimension helps us both to identify important ‘blind spots’ of
existing treatments of diffusion mechanisms and to show the signiﬁcant
conceptual complementarities that exist between them. Thus, it promotes
a focus on conceptual complementarities rather than opposites between
different theoretical approaches (an argument with a similar spirit is that
advanced in Jupille, Mattli and Snidal 2013). I develop these implications in
the conclusion.
On the other hand, scholars of frames in comparative politics have
focused on frames’ endogenous origins, neglecting the fact that they might
also have international origins and thus diffuse across organizations. As
Benford and Snow (2000, 628) noted in a review of the literature, ‘To date,
few movement framing scholars have considered diffusion issues.’ Yet,
whereas an endogenously rooted conception of frames is analytically useful
in understanding divergent institutional choices across structurally similar
situations (see, e.g., Bleich 2002), the present article aims to show that the
mechanism of frame diffusion is useful in accounting for converging
institutional choices in structurally diverse settings.
The article proceeds in three parts. The next part clariﬁes the theoretical
puzzle by examining, in relation to the three cases under study, three
prominent arguments – drawn from international political economy,
neofunctionalism, and realism – that have been advanced to explain regional
economic cooperation. I argue that these arguments offer important insights
into the general prerequisites for economic cooperation in all three regions,
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but are largely indeterminate regarding its speciﬁc institutional form. Next,
I theoretically develop the mechanism of frame diffusion and discuss the
emergence and evolution of relevant frames in the current context, before
spelling out some observable implications. I then offer a plausibility probe by
comparing critical episodes of institutional choice in the most different
regional organizations; namely, ASEAN, Mercosur, and SADC. Rather than
deﬁnitive, the analysis is intended to be illustrative of the theoretical idea that
transnational frames can guide policymakers across structurally different
contexts towards similar types of institutional choices in regional economic
cooperation, and to suggest that this process was at play in the adoption of
common market objectives in ASEAN, Mercosur, and SADC.
These cases are useful for illustrating the argument because they differ
from the EU on a number of important structural variables, including
economic proﬁles and development levels, dominant regime type, the dis-
tribution of power amongmember states, dominant legal systems, as well as
cultural conditions such as dominant religion and civilizational category
that have been argued to affect the economic liberalization strategies of
states (for a good overview, see Mansﬁeld and Solingen 2010). This makes
it possible to control for these variables largely by design, as in a most
different systems design (Online Appendix A provides a schematic overview
of these differences). Moreover, the three cases can be interpreted as least
likely cases for the adoption of common markets because, unlike in many
other regional organizations in the developing world, policymakers in these
three regions explicitly rejected EU-style integration initially because they
perceived it as an overly ambitious form of economic cooperation and
therefore inadequate for their speciﬁc context (see Campbell, Rozemberg
and Svarzman 1999, 56–64; Lee 2003, 47; Severino 2006, 4–6). In sum,
these cases are useful for illustrating the theoretical argument and
important to understand in their own right.
Puzzle: converging institutional choices in regional economic cooperation
Even though the EU might be the most prominent and successful exponent
of regional economic cooperation, it is not the only one that pursues
ambitious cooperation objectives. The members of ASEAN, the Southern
Cone/Mercosur, and SADC have similarly started to pursue the objective to
establish a common market that involves the free movement of goods,
services, capital and labor, and, in Mercosur and SADC, also a customs
union, through a gradual process that involves some degree of harmoni-
zation of national legislation, and therefore the adoption of secondary legal
instruments at the regional level. This approach to economic cooperation is
distinct from that taken in the North American Free Trade Agreement
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(NAFTA),which aims to achieve, through a one-off deal, amore limited and less
intrusive free trade area that encompasses primarily trade in goods and services,
plus some rules on investment. Table 1 shows these gradually converging
institutional choices across two central episodes of organizational evolution.
The analytical focus on institutional convergence is not to deny that
important differences exist between these four organizations regarding the
details of market integration, the institutional frameworks that accompany
them, and the extent to which codiﬁed objectives have actually been achieved
(for overviews, see Haftel 2013 and Gray 2014). Nevertheless, I maintain
that the adoption of common market objectives, codiﬁed in formal treaties
and often accompanied by detailed action plans, is important, for two rea-
sons. First, they serve as guiding frameworks for more detailed agreements
and secondary legislation that, upon domestic ratiﬁcation, are binding on
member states. Second, they shape expectations among social actors
Table 1. Increasing convergence in institutional choices in three regional
organizations
Episode ASEAN (1967)
Southern Cone/
Mercosur (1980) SADC(C) (1981)
Early choices Selective functional
cooperation, mainly in
foreign policy; limited
economic cooperation
after 1976
(preferential trading,
industrial
complementation)
Selective functional
cooperation between
Argentina and Brazil,
mainly in nuclear
energy; limited
economic
cooperation from
1986 onwards
(sectoral
liberalization)
Selective functional
cooperation, mainly in
non-economic areas;
limited economic
cooperation after
1987 (trade and
investment promotion
activities)
First transformative
choice
1992 ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (AFTA):
liberalization of trade
in goods
1988 Argentina-Brazil
FTA: liberalization of
trade in goods and
services
1993 Windhoek Treaty:
Common market in
goods, services,
capital, and labor
Second transformative
choice
2003 Bali Concord II,
2004 Vientiane Action
Program: Common
market in goods,
services, investment,
some capital, and
skilled labor
1991 Asunción Treaty:
Common market in
goods, services,
capital, and labor;
customs union
2003 RISDP: Common
market in goods,
services, capital and
labor; customs union;
economic and
monetary union
ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Mercosur=Common Market of
the South; SADC= Southern African Development Community.
Source: Author’s compilation on the basis of ofﬁcial documents.
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regarding the future direction of economic policies in a region. Furthermore,
the empirical phenomenon of converging institutional choices across struc-
turally dissimilar contexts poses a theoretical puzzle that merits exploration.
What explains these converging institutional choices? Existing
arguments suggest that choices similar to those in the EU are the result of
policymakers in the three regions reacting rationally to similar incentives
and constraints, or of powerful outside actors imposing the same choices
across different organizations – the ﬁrst two categories of explanation
mentioned in the introduction. Even though they offer important insights
into the general prerequisites for economic cooperation in all three regions,
I suggest that they are indeterminate regarding the speciﬁc form that such
cooperation takes. In particular, I argue that they cannot explain why
policymakers in all three regions eventually moved beyond a NAFTA-style
free trade agreement (FTA) to endorse a more ambitious common market
objective. I consider the three main arguments in turn.
The ﬁrst argument, advanced by scholars of international political
economy, focuses on economic interdependence and private interest groups
that lobby governments in order to facilitate transnational economic
exchange. Recent decades have witnessed technological advances that
expanded opportunities for international economic transactions. When
tariff and non-tariff barriers continue to hamper cross-border trade, inter-
national agreements can be powerful tools to reduce transaction costs and
to credibly commit states to liberal economic policies. From this pers-
pective, private interest groups are prompted into action when the trans-
action costs of, and the potential for increasing, transnational economic
exchange are high (Milner 1995; Mattli 1999). Consequently, the ambition
of regional economic cooperation varies with opportunities for, and
constraints on, transnational economic exchange.
There is little doubt that the constraints on coordinated economic liber-
alization lessened with domestic economic liberalization in many member
states in the 1980s and 1990s. A broad convergence in domestic economic
policies has rendered ambitious regional economic cooperation possible, as
this argument suggests. It is also true that large increases in economic inter-
dependence since the 1970s have enhanced general incentives for inter-
national economic cooperation. However, in the absence of converging
regional incentives and strong interest group lobbying, this argument is
largely indeterminate regarding the speciﬁc institutional form of resulting
cooperation. Figure 1 sketches trade interdependence – a widely used proxy
for underlying economic incentives – across the four organizations in the
5 years prior to key decisions on the deepening of regional economic coop-
eration. The ﬁgure indicates that economic incentives are generally lower in
the three regions than they were in Europe in the 1950s, a decade after a
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devastating war had destroyed those countries’ economies.2 Varying and, in
absolute terms, comparatively low levels of trade interdependence in the three
cases are difﬁcult to reconcile with converging institutional choices regarding
the establishment of a common market. This assessment is shared in the sec-
ondary literature. In an analysis of economic regionalism in Asia and the
Americas, Haggard concluded that there is ‘little evidence for the theory that
higher levels of interdependence generate the demand for deeper integration’
(1997, 45). Similarly, in a recent review of economic integration in Africa,
Draper proposed that regional economic cooperation ‘does not hold nearly as
much potential to overcome it [under-development] as integration with
dynamic and large external markets’ (2012, 78).
Moreover, interest groups did not lobby for this speciﬁc institutional
form. In fact, such groups appear to have been either irrelevant or even
opposed to the institutional choices in question. In a detailed historical
study of the construction of Mercosur, Gardini noted that these groups’
‘initial indifference shifted to reluctance and skepticism, especially in
Figure 1 Trade interdependence in four regional organizations. ASEAN=Association
of Southeast Asian Nations; Mercosur=Common Market of the South; SADC=
Southern African Development Community.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the Unu-Cris trade database: http://www.cris.
unu.edu/riks/web/data/customIndex, measure on intra-regional trade share; for the EU,
data is from Eichengreen (2008) on the basis of IMF Direction of Trade Statistics,
1948–1980.
2 The higher numbers of intra-regional trade in ASEAN are mainly due to Singapore’s role as
an entrepôt for intra- and extra-regional trade, which inﬂates the numbers (Ravenhill 2010, 182).
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Argentina’ (2006, 8). Similar assessments dominate the literature on ASEAN.
The former Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino stated ﬂatly, ‘governments
feel no pressure from ASEAN business to move faster on regional economic
integration’ (2006, 249). In SADC, business interests are notable for their
absence from the secondary literature; they are simply not mentioned. In
general, proponents of this argument admit its potential indeterminacy, as
Mansﬁeld and Solingen noted, ‘intraregional and extraregional bilateral, tri-
lateral, and region-wide PTAs [preferential trade agreements] are compatible
with internationalizing coalitions’ (2010, 155).3
The second argument, advanced by neofunctionalists, focuses on endo-
genous spill-over dynamics under conditions of technological progress and
economic interdependence. This argument proposes that processes of
regional economic cooperation become more ambitious as a result of
self-reinforcing dynamics associated with the functional connectedness of
policy ﬁelds as well as supranational entrepreneurship. In this account,
supranational institutions with meaningful autonomous capacity play a key
role in nourishing support for, and themselves pursuing integrative agendas
towards, more ambitious forms of economic cooperation (Haas 1958;
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). It follows that the ambition of regional
economic cooperation grows with both economic interdependence and the
existence of supranational entrepreneurs.
Again, this argument points to important prerequisites for economic
cooperation in the form of growing incentives and declining constraints,
but it is indeterminate regarding the speciﬁc institutional form resulting
from it in the absence of supranational entrepreneurship. Structurally, the
autonomy of institutions varies radically across the cases, and is rather
limited outside of the EU. Drawing on the Measure of International
Authority (MIA) data set (Hooghe et al. 2017), Figure 2 compares the
autonomy of the two main regional institutions – dispute settlement
mechanisms and general secretariats – in the 5 years leading up to key
decisions on regional economic cooperation (see Online Appendix B
for details on coding). More autonomous dispute settlement mechanisms
were created following key decisions on regional economic cooperation,
especially in the Southern Cone/Mercosur and SADC. General
secretariats are somewhat stronger, but their independence also varies
3 Indeterminacy also characterizes arguments that emphasize member state preferences for
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) as a source of ambitious regional economic cooperation
(see, e.g., Haftel 2010). In the absence of speciﬁc pressures by interest groups for this speciﬁc
institutional form, it is not obvious that regional common market building is a more efﬁcient
realization of this goal than, say, the signing of bilateral investment treaties with important
potential providers of FDI.
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widely across cases. Overall, this variation does not point towards converging
institutional choices. The secondary literature bolsters this assessment.
Unlike the 1992 program in Europe (see Sandholtz and Zysman 1989),
supranational institutions are far from being an important facilitator of
negotiations for more ambitious economic cooperation in the other regions.
The institutional choices examined in this article are the result of a process
of intergovernmental negotiations that, most observers concur, are
largely monopolized by governments (see Lee 2003; Malamud 2005;
Ravenhill 2010).
A third argument, inspired by realism, emphasizes the role of hegemonic
outside actors in imposing convergent institutional choice by manipulating
target governments’ opportunities and constraints; what Elkins and Simmons
(2005) call ‘hegemonic coordination.’ Hegemons, or the international
organizations through which they act, often advance particular institutional
choices elsewhere in the pursuit of geostrategic or economic interests.
Countries that are dependent on outside actors are particularly susceptible to
this pressure.
This argument also provides insights into the question at hand. There is
no doubt that international ﬁnancial institutions played an important role
in advancing domestic economic liberalization through structural adjustment
Figure 2 Formal autonomy of selected regional institutions in four regional
organizations. ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Mercosur=
Common Market of the South; SADC= Southern African Development
Community. Source: Hooghe et al. 2017, partly based on own calculations on the
basis of their coding scheme.
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programs in the 1980s, especially in the Southern Cone and Southern Africa
(Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Teichman 2001). Again, this convergence in
domestic economic policies was a necessary prerequisite for ambitious
regional economic cooperation. However, hegemons did not impose a
speciﬁc institutional choice, which renders this argument indeterminate for
the question at hand. In fact, international ﬁnancial institutions were not
only indifferent to cooperation beyond unilateral liberalization; they also
criticized regional organizations for undermining multilateral liberalization
and for diverting trade (see Yeats 1998). Moreover, especially in the
SADCC case, internationally imposed austerity measures put the continued
viability of regional cooperation at risk (see, e.g., SADCC Secretariat
1987, 70). Thus, the actions of international ﬁnancial institutions
undermined, rather than supported, the speciﬁc institutional form that
ultimately emerged.
On the other hand, the United States has operated mainly through a series of
bilateral trade deals in the context of larger cross-regional frameworks such as
Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation or the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas. While these initiatives certainly facilitated coordinated economic
liberalization, many observers agree that they have weakened rather than
strengthened ambitious regional economic cooperation (for an overview, see
Haggard 1997). The EU is the only global power that supports such endeavors.
However, many of the relevant decisions were made prior to the EU’s direct
engagement with them. With the potential exception of SADC, a case I discuss
below, there is little evidence that pressure from the EU drove those decisions
(see also Lenz 2012).
In conclusion, existing explanations of economic regionalism, and of
international economic cooperation more broadly, conceive of converging
institutional choices as the result of independent reactions to similar
structural conditions, or of outside imposition. While all of these arguments
provide insights into the changing incentives and constraints for regional
economic cooperation, they are largely indeterminate regarding the speciﬁc
institutional form that such cooperation takes. Thus, the explanatory
challenge is to account for the adoption of a speciﬁc institutional form of
regional economic cooperation (common markets) over a plausible alter-
native (FTAs) across settings that remain structurally diverse and in the
absence of outside imposition. Below, I suggest that the concept of frame
diffusion provides a plausible response to this challenge.
Theorizing frame diffusion
The mechanism of frame diffusion combines (1) a speciﬁc object (frames)
with (2) a process (diffusion) by which that object exerts an impact on
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political decision-making, resulting, under certain conditions, in (3) converg-
ing institutional choices across structurally diverse contexts at the macro level.
I discuss these three elements of the mechanism in turn, before sketching the
evolution of the common market frame, and its main alternative, in regional
economic cooperation and outlining some observable implications of the
argument. The frame diffusion mechanism is depicted in Figure 3.
What are frames and how do they emerge?
Frames are cognitive tools that help actors organize information in a com-
plex environment. In his pioneering work on the topic, Goffman (1974, 21)
deﬁned frames as ‘schemas of interpretation’ that help individuals ‘to
locate, perceive, identify, and label’ events. By serving as interpretive fra-
meworks, they imbue these events with meaning, and thereby create shared
understandings among actors that legitimate and motivate action. Frames
have both a diagnostic and a prognostic element (see Snow and Benford
1988, 199–201). They allow actors to identify a problem in terms of its
speciﬁc attributes and underlying causes, and suggest solutions by specify-
ing strategies to deal with it. Thus, frames can be seen as cognitive problem–
response schemas that associate speciﬁc problems with particular solutions
(on this notion in cognitive psychology, see Fiske and Taylor 2013).4
In so doing, frames emphasize certain aspects of a problem and
de-emphasize others, thereby excluding alternative interpretations and
solutions. As Entman noted, frames affect outcomes ‘by selecting
and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others’ (1993, 53).
In short, frames shape perceptions, and therefore action.
Figure 3 Mechanism of frame diffusion.
4 This conceptualization is akin to what others have termed ‘causal beliefs’ (Goldstein and
Keohane 1993) and ‘cognitive ideas’ (Campbell 1998). Schema is the term widely used in the
cognitive literature (see Khong 1992; Fiske and Taylor 2013). I use it largely synonymously with
scripts, which are often seen as schemas for action. Templates andmodels are colloquially used to
refer to a similar phenomenon, but they tend to be tied to a speciﬁc source, whereas frames are
more abstract.
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From this perspective, frames are prominent institutional innovations
that have become theorized in abstract terms.5 Institutional innovations
solve an existing cooperation problem by novel institutional means and
thereby deviate from established institutional forms. Thus, institutional
innovators have ‘the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities’
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 963). Consider the following example. After
the First World War, United States President Woodrow Wilson sought to
stabilize the international system, not in the traditional way by renewing a
balance-of-power-logic, but by institutionalizing the ‘new’ idea of collective
security through the League of Nations. Wilson translated an institutional
form that had hitherto been known only in the domestic context to the
international level upon the presumption that it would work in similar
ways. Thus, he innovated institutionally by enacting what Suganami (1989)
has termed the ‘domestic analogy.’However, institutional innovations tend
to be geared towards solving a speciﬁc cooperation problem that emerges in
a particular context; that is, they often arise in unique circumstances. How
do broadly applicable frames result from such situations?
Frames form when an institutional innovation is abstracted from the
speciﬁc context in which it originally emerged. This process involves
translating an innovation into a typical instance of a more general rela-
tionship, or a generalized problem–response sequence – a process that
facilitates the innovation’s use in diverse contexts. Strang and Meyer
termed this phenomenon ‘theorization’ and deﬁned it as the ‘development
and speciﬁcation of abstract categories and the formulation of patterned
relationships such as chains of cause and effect’ (1993, 492). Theorization
involves the interpretation of regularities, the identiﬁcation of similarities
across diverse contexts, and the provision of ‘rational’ reasons why these
similarities are theoretically meaningful. As Strang and Meyer noted, the-
orization is important because ‘without such [theorized] models, the real
diversity of social life is likely to seem as meaningful as are parallelisms’
(1993, 492). While institutional innovators themselves may engage in
theorization because they have an interest in translating their innovation
into a generalized frame that is more widely applicable (see Meyer and
Rowan 1977, 353), theorization is most credible when it involves ‘cultu-
rally legitimated theorists’ (Strang and Meyer 1993, 494). Such theorists
encompass scientists, policy analysts, consultants, and professionals (on the
role of the latter, see also DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 152–53).
5 It is difﬁcult to predict ex ante which institutional innovations will become theorized, and
thus turn into frames, because this process is highly contingent. I presume that it is determined
primarily by a mix of three factors: an innovation’s prominence, its success, and the power of the
innovator to promote theorization.
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Particularly relevant for the emergence of frames based on institutional
innovations is what Strang and Meyer (1993) called the theorization of
practices. This term denotes the process by which theoretical accounts
‘simplify and abstract their [institutional innovations’] properties and
specify and explain the outcomes they produce’ (Strang and Meyer 1993,
497). This form of theorization facilitates perceiving and communicating
about an institutional innovation and also explains why its adoption is
likely to produce similar outcomes across seemingly diverse contexts.
Moreover, theorization of practices involves specifying the theoretical link
between the underlying cooperation problem and the institutional solution,
and different theorists may shift the emphasis from one cooperation pro-
blem to another. When this occurs, it positions an institutional innovation
as a suitable solution to a broader range of potential problems, making it
more widely applicable. Whereas the innovator’s solution SI may initially
be associated primarily with problem P1, theorization by different theorists
may lead to associating this solution with another underlying problem P2.
6
Below, I show how the adoption of a common market in regional economic
cooperation has over time become associated with different cooperation
problems through processes of theorization, rendering an EU institutional
innovation widely applicable to other contexts. How do such theorized
institutional innovations, or frames, affect political decision-making?
How do frames affect political decision-making?
Frames affect political decision-making by helping policymakers to under-
stand the underlying cooperation problem and to devise a ‘suitable’ solu-
tion. Frame-based decision-making works through analogical reasoning,
which is a form of thinking in which novel situations are assimilated into
existing problem–response schemas. As Vosniadou and Ortony (1989, 6)
put it, analogical reasoning ‘involves the transfer of relational information
from a domain that already exists in memory […] to the domain to be
explained’ (see also Khong 1992). When policymakers encounter a novel
cooperation problem, they do not seek to understand the problem and
devise solutions from scratch; instead, they draw on mentally accessible
frames that help them deal with similar challenges (on the role of accessi-
bility in judgment and decision-making, see Kahnemann 2011). Social
psychologists have long recognized that ‘objects and events in the
phenomenal world are almost never approached as if they were sui generis
conﬁgurations but rather are assimilated into pre-existing structures in the
mind of the perceiver’ (Nisbett and Ross 1980, 36; see also Zerubavel 1999,
6 I am grateful to a reviewer for encouraging me to develop this point.
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24). Similarly, Strang andMeyer noted that an ‘individual or organization’s
cognitive map identiﬁes reference groups that bound social comparison
processes’ (1993, 491). I contend that when the cooperation problem an
organization faces appears similar to the problem identiﬁed by a prominent
frame, this frame is likely to guide decision-making.
Frames serve two key functions in the decision-making process. First,
they provide a shared understanding of the underlying cooperation
problem. Cooperation challenges are not obvious and cannot simply be
derived from underlying fundamentals. In Blyth’s (2003) apt formulation,
‘structures do not come with an instruction sheet’. Many ‘objective’
problems are not addressed because no agreement on a suitable course of
action can be found. Sociologists have long recognized that problems are
constructed through cognitive and societal processes (see, e.g., Cohen,
March and Olsen 1972; for an overview, see van Hulst and Yanow 2016).
Similarly, constructivists suggest that successful bargaining requires
‘common knowledge concerning both the deﬁnition of the situation and an
agreement about the underlying “rules of the game”’ (Risse 2000, 2). Thus,
frames render a given cooperation problem intelligible to policymakers by
allowing them to understand it as an instance of a more general pheno-
menon, which in turn helps them to ﬁnd agreement on the necessity of
taking political action. This enabling function of frames is central to socio-
logical work that emphasizes their potential for ‘consensus mobilization’
(Klandermans 1984), and it is highlighted in recent work on international
agreements, which argues that framing is a useful concept ‘to understand
how such agreements become possible in the ﬁrst place’ (Charnysh, Lloyd
and Simmons 2015, 345). It is particularly relevant in the international
context, where decision-making tends to take the form of formalized agree-
ments that generally require consensus among actors operating in the
decentralized setting of intergovernmental negotiations.
Second, frames affect political decision-making by linking problems to
speciﬁc institutional solutions, thereby restricting the range of conceivable
options that actors consider in response to the problem. As Zerubavel
noted, ‘social situations are typically surrounded by mental fences which
mark off only part of what is actually included in our perceptual ﬁeld
as relevant, thereby separating that which we are supposed to leave “in the
background” and essentially ignore’ (1999, 37). A frame links a speciﬁc
understanding of a problem to certain solutions and not others, and thereby
‘convinces actors about the general contours of new arrangements’
(Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996, 3). As cognitive schemas, frames thus
introduce bias into decision-making. Recent work on international institu-
tions shows empirically that actors ‘do not do a full search and comparison of
the whole range of alternatives’ (Jupille, Mattli and Snidal 2013, 34), but
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often restrict their choice range to variations on the frame’s prognostic element.
In other words, frames anchor political decision-making, and thereby bias it.
Frame diffusion and convergence in institutional choice: under which
conditions?
The above discussion suggests that frame-based decision-making, through
its reliance on analogical reasoning, is likely to lead to convergence in
institutional outcomes at the macro level. This phenomenon can be con-
ceptualized as a form of diffusion – the third stylized explanation for
institutional convergence outlined in the introduction. The diffusion
literature’s distinct claim is that the institutional choices of some actors
systematically shape those of other actors, such that institutional choice is
‘characterized by interdependent, but uncoordinated, decision-making’
across units of analysis (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 38; see also Shipan and
Volden 2008). This is also the key insight of Strang andMeyer (1993), who
linked theorization to the likelihood and speed of institutional convergence.
From a diffusion perspective, then, frames originate in one regional
organization and guide policymakers from collective perceptions of
underlying cooperation problems to appropriate solutions in other regional
organizations through analogical reasoning. Thus, frames can have inter-
national origins and spread across organizations.7
This explanation is distinct from one that emphasizes similar yet inde-
pendent reactions to similar structural conditions – the ﬁrst stylized expla-
nation for institutional convergence mentioned in the introduction. It may
be objected that an explanation emphasizing frame diffusion becomes
indistinguishable from an explanation focusing on similar reactions to
similar problems because both explanations view institutional convergence
as the result of the emergence of similar cooperation problems. In other
words, do we need to emphasize cognitive problem–response schemas and
their diffusion in order to understand why actors react similarly to similar
structural problems? I would say yes, for two reasons. First, problems are
never ‘objectively’ given and readily perceived similarly by all relevant
actors. Although cooperation problems exist in the absence of frames,
frames render ill-deﬁned situations intelligible and thereby ‘actionable’ for
policymakers (van Hulst and Yanow 2016, 97–98). Second, the ‘similar
7 This argument about institutional choice and convergence is compatible with the under-
standing of diffusion expressed in Strang and Meyer, who viewed it as boundedly rational. They
wrote: ‘In short, theorization may be regarded as turning diffusion into rational choice’ (1993,
500). However, this view deviates somewhat from Meyer’s earlier work on diffusion, which
exclusively emphasizes legitimacy concerns, independent of any functional need (see Meyer and
Rowan 1977).
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problems-similar responses–explanation’ does not expect similar problems to
lead to similar solutions in structurally diverse contexts. Instead, it would
expect the adopted solutions to reﬂect structural differences in context, even if
they address similar problems. In other words, the ‘supply’ of institutional
outcomes should differ in structurally diverse contexts even if common
problems generate a similar demand because rational policymakers anticipate
different institutional effects of similar institutions in different structural
contexts. This should translate into differences in the adopted solutions. In
contrast, an explanation emphasizing frame diffusion suggests that even
policymakers in diverse structural settings adopt similar solutions in response
to similarly perceived problems because frame-based decision-making
abstracts from the speciﬁc context, thereby biasing institutional choice.
Even though the emergence of new frames is relatively rare, there is
generally more than one frame available to affect decision-making. This
observation cuts to the heart of institutional choice, which is the process by
which governments select from among institutional alternatives in response
to a new cooperation challenge (see Jupille, Mattli and Snidal 2013, 4).
How do policymakers choose between frames?
Drawing on Strang and Meyer, I propose that theorization does not fully
obliterate the ideational afﬁnity between a speciﬁc frame and the originating
organization, but broadens it. As a result, the frame becomes associated with
a generic type of organization, rather than a single organization. Strang and
Meyer refer to this form as the theorization of adopters, which establishes
similarities between innovating organizations and potential adopters of a
frame in such a way as to ‘deﬁne populations within which diffusion is
imaginable and sensible’ (Strang and Meyer 1993, 495). This argument
implies that frame diffusion, and resulting institutional convergence, should
be observable only within speciﬁc groups of regional organizations, while
institutional diversity may persist between them.8 Importantly, such groups
are not deﬁnedmaterially – for example by the nature and complementarity of
their economies – but ideationally. Strang and Meyer refer to such groups as
‘social categories’ and suggest that ‘the cultural understanding that social
entities belong to a common social category constructs a tie between them.
[…] We argue that where actors are seen as falling into the same social
category, diffusion should be rapid’ (1993, 490).9What are these categories in
the realm of regional economic cooperation?
8 The argument thereby follows recent arguments in the study of causal mechanisms sug-
gesting that mechanisms ‘may produce different results in analytically nonequivalent contexts’
(Faletti and Lynch 2009, 3).
9 A related but somewhat different discussion of the relationship between frames and
identities is given in van Hulst and Yanow (2016, 102–3).
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I suggest focusing on the purpose of an organization as the main determi-
nant of social category in regional economic cooperation. The purpose of an
organization is the basic goal, or ultimate objective, which it serves. From this
perspective, two basic social categories can be distinguished: market-building
and community-building organizations. In the former type, regional economic
cooperation is seen as an end in itself. In this view, regional economic
cooperation is useful because it helps policymakers to achieve the key
economic objective of enhancing a country’s welfare by facilitating trade
across national borders. This consideration is emphasized widely in the
literature on preferential trade agreements (see, e.g., Mansﬁeld and Solingen
2010). Community-building organizations, in contrast, view regional econo-
mic cooperation not as an end in itself but as a means towards a broader goal,
namely that of building a regional community. The EU’s initial goal of ‘ever
closer Union’ is an expression of this community building purpose, and so is
the Economic Community of Western African State’s stipulation that
‘the ultimate objective of their efforts [is] the creation of a homogenous
society, leading to the unity of the West African states’ (1975 ECOWAS
Treaty, Preamble). Such organizations tend to be characterized by a broader
policy scope in which economic cooperation is just one of many policy areas.
These types of organizations often emerge in contexts where deep security
dilemmas are present, or where communal foundations already exist, perhaps
due to a common history as a federation (see Marks et al. 2014).10
This distinction implies that policymakers in regional organizations
whose social purpose is to build a regional community are more likely to
draw on the common market frame in the process of decision-making than
organizations that are engaged in market building. In other words, policy-
makers’ collective self-understandings crucially shape their choice of
frames, and thus their reaction to particular cooperation problems.11
Cutting to the essence of frame-based decision-making, I suggest that
policymakers in different types of organizations perceive, and thus react to,
different cooperation problems in the ﬁrst place, and they react to the same
cooperation problem in different ways.12 What are the cooperation
10 Though not coterminous with any existing concepts, similar distinctions are widespread in
the literature. Hooghe and Marks (2003), for example, distinguish between type 1 and type 2
governance (see also Lenz et al. 2015; Lenz and Burilkov 2017), and Baccini, Duer and Haftel
(2015) juxtapose an EU and a US model for deep economic integration.
11 In their function, these social categories are akin to what Goldstein and Keohane termed
‘world views’, which ‘deﬁne the universe of possibilities for action’ (1993, 9).
12 Thus, the argument also differs from arguments about competition or tit-for-tat
regionalism in that the same exogenous shock can lead to different institutional responses,
depending on the frame that guides policymaking. I will return to this issue in the conclusion.
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problems that underlie frame-based decision-making in these two groups of
organizations? This is the question we turn to now.
The common market frame and its alternative
The common market frame emerged out of Western Europe’s cooperation
experience, and the underlying institutional innovation was subsequently
theorized in different ways, gradually widening its potential appeal. Whereas
the common market frame initially conceived a common market as an
appropriate response to the security dilemma stemming from differences in
power between neighboring states, it also became associated, over time, with
the problem of under-development and economic dependence and with
challenges of competitiveness in the international economy. The competing
NAFTA frame engages a similar cooperation problem – challenges of inter-
national competitiveness – but proposes an alternative institutional solution:
an FTA. Table 2 summarizes the content of the relevant frames.
The ‘original’ common market frame is rooted in an institutional inno-
vation in Western Europe after the Second World War that was developed
by Jean Monnet, one of the founding architects of European integration.
Attempting to avoid a resurgence of German hegemony in a situation in
which ‘history offered no precedent’ (Jean Monnet, cited in Suganami
1989, 138), Monnet and others sought to bind Germany into an institu-
tionalized process of economic cooperation that was to induce ‘ever closer
Table 2. Content of relevant frames (date of emergence in brackets)
Frame Diagnosis of problem Suggested response
‘Original’ common
market frame
(1950s/60s)
Economic cooperation as a solution
to security dilemmas between
neighboring states with different
power
Design a gradual process of
functional spillover to move
towards a common market
‘Re-directed’
common market
frame (1960/70s)
Economic cooperation as a solution
to under-development and
economic dependence
Design a common market,
protected by a customs union
‘New’ common
market frame
(1980s/1990s)
Economic cooperation as a solution
to challenges of international
competitiveness
Design a commonmarket (customs
union less emphasized)
Alternative: FTA
frame/‘open
regionalism’
(1990s)
Economic cooperation as a solution
to challenges of international
competitiveness
Design an FTA outside, but
compatible with, multilateral
economic cooperation
FTA= free trade agreement.
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Union’ among the participating countries (see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and
Verdier 2005, 104–10). The ﬁrst step in this approach was to establish joint
control over the crucial war resources of coal and steel (EuropeanCoal and Steel
Community), followed by the integration of nuclear energy (Euratom) and the
establishment of a common market and customs union (European Economic
Community). Suganami described the innovative character of this approach as
follows: ‘reliance upon the domestic analogy is implicit not only in the ultimate
ideal of the United States of Europe […] but also in the idea of creating an
institutional framework by which various sectors of the member-states’
domestic economies are to be united to form a “commonmarket”’ (1989, 139).
Thus, the European experience grounded not only the emergence of a common
market frame, but also the ideational afﬁnity between the common market
frame and regional organizations purposed towards community building.
Shortly after policymakers began to implement this political proposal, it
also started to be theorized in abstract terms. The main actors in the process
were early neofunctionalist scholars such as Ernst Haas, and they engaged
in both forms of theorization mentioned by Strang andMeyer. Haas (1958)
theorized the practice of European integration as a generally applicable
response to the security dilemmas between neighboring states with vastly
different power. He abstracted the speciﬁc European problem–response
sequence as a generalizable process of functional spillover between con-
nected policy ﬁelds that would gradually evolve from functionally limited
beginnings towards a more encompassing common market, thereby
increasingly constraining the power of individual member states (Haas
1958; see also Balassa 1961; Lindberg 1963). As Rosamond noted, neo-
functionalism constitutes ‘an attempt to theorize the strategies of the
founding elites of post-war European unity’ (2000, 51). This clearly
enhanced the appeal of the seemingly unique European experience for
policymakers elsewhere that faced similar challenges, while directing
attention away from other interpretations of the cooperation challenge and
other conceivable responses. For example, weaker states can seek to secure
peace by punishing a temporarily weakened hegemon, or they can balance
against the hegemon with the help of powerful outsiders. If they choose to
cooperate, they can envisage a shallower and functionally less inclusive
economic agreement – an FTA in goods, for example – that can take different
forms: a bilateral or a plurilateral agreement, or multilateral cooperation in
the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (see Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni and Verdier 2005, 104–11). Overall, the commonmarket frame
was geographically more limited and functionally more inclusive than
potential alternatives.
Moreover, neofunctionalists not only theorized the practice of economic
cooperation itself but also identiﬁed, at least implicitly, the population of
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potential adopters. Haas (1958) theorized that functional spillover
would lead to a gradual transfer of loyalties of all involved actors to the
regional level. As he noted in his article International Integration: The
European and the Universal Process, ‘We are interested in tracing progress
toward a terminal condition called political community’ (1961, 366).
This implied that the adoption of a common market would be useful
speciﬁcally for those countries that wanted to construct a regional
community (see also Lindberg 1963). According to this view, economic
cooperation did not constitute an end in itself, but served as a means
towards that broader goal.
Thus, a common market frame started to develop by the late 1950s and
early 1960s, but its wider applicability remained limited by the focus on
security dilemmas between unequal neighbors. Its applicability grew when
theorists and policymakers in Latin America and Africa re-directed the
‘original’ frame towards a somewhat different rationale in the 1960s and
early 1970s, rendering it as an appropriate response to the problem of
under-development and economic dependence. The practice of creating a
common market was theorized as a tool to enhance regional self-reliance
through the creation of larger and highly protected markets among devel-
oping countries that pursued import-substitution policies – an idea
advanced speciﬁcally by the Economic Commission for Latin America and
its Executive Secretary Raúl Prebisch (see, e.g., Prebisch 1963). This
‘re-directed’ common market frame shifted the focus away from ‘the
European concern with European integration as a means to avoid war
towards an approach whereby regional economic cooperation/integration
was considered a means for economic development’ (Söderbaum 2016, 24).
This rendering excluded alternative solutions to the problem of under-
development, such as more liberal economic policies that came to be
adopted in later periods, and it is arguably an important reason why, in the
1960s and 1970s, policymakers ‘in all parts of the Third World ﬂirted with
regionalism on the European model’ (Mayall 1995, 184).
The common market frame underwent a further theorization of the
practice in the 1980s in the wake of Europe’s 1992 program, which laid out
a detailed plan for the completion of the common market. European
policymakers justiﬁed the initiative as a ‘solution to the problem of
Europe’s lack of competitiveness’ (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996, 12).
Economists associated with the program theorized a well-functioning
commonmarket more generally as an appropriate response to the challenge
of a globalizing world economy and growing international competition
(Padoa-Schioppa et al. 1987; Emerson et al. 1988). Thus, the ‘new’ frame
re-directed the purpose of the common market from an inward-oriented
solution to regional security dilemmas and under-development towards an
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outward-oriented solution to increasing international competition. Once
again, common market building emphasized one set of solutions at the
expense of alternatives, such as purely national strategies, or closer links
with Japan, the emerging competitor (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989, 106).
It biased emphasis.
At around the same time, North American policymakers also reacted to
an increasing sense that international competition was growing, but did so
in a different way than their European counterparts. In 1988, they con-
cluded the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement, which was extended to
Mexico in 1992 and named NAFTA. Beyond these genuinely regional
initiatives, US policymakers also advanced the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic
Cooperation and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). These
initiatives were seen by the involved actors as ‘crucial to a more efﬁcient,
competitive, and export-oriented economy’ (Milner 1995, 348), but pol-
icymakers responded to this challenge by designing a functionally more
limited FTA that liberalized trade in individual sectors, especially goods and
services (and some investment). Sparked by these institutional innovations
of the architect and major supporter of the post-war multilateral trading
system, policy analysts, often lodged in inﬂuential international organiza-
tions, quickly theorized this problem–response sequence. They portrayed
the negotiation of FTAs below the multilateral level as an appropriate
response to the challenge of increasing international competition (see APEC
1994), thereby giving rise to an alternative FTA frame. This frame has
become most clearly theorized in the concept of ‘open regionalism,’ which
portrays functionally limited regional economic cooperation as an appro-
priate response to the myriad challenges associated with globalization and
defends the general compatibility of this approach with multilateral trade
liberalization (for an overview, see Bergsten 1997). However, the emer-
gence of this frame has put purely multilateral strategies for dealing with
heightened international competition on the defensive.
Observable implications
What type of empirical evidence would corroborate this argument about
frame diffusion? Framing arguments, like other arguments about cognitive
processes, are difﬁcult to verify conclusively with observational data
because they relate to mental processes of actors that are difﬁcult to tap
directly. Nevertheless, following many qualitative studies on frames and
studies on cognitive heuristics, such arguments can be made plausible by
tapping frame diffusion indirectly, through its observable implications.
Even though not all implications are distinct from those suggested by
alternative arguments, taken together they ‘form a “signature” that is quite
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unique’ (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 18). Observable implications concern
three dimensions of institutional choice.
1. Timing: Institutional choice tracks the perception of a cooperation
problem that relevant frames theorize as requiring regional economic
cooperation. This link to existing frames should be reﬂected in the verbal
justiﬁcations of an initiative.
2. Process: The ensuing debate reﬂects a frame’s diagnostic and prognostic
elements, and draws parallels with the organization from which it
emerged. Policymakers quickly agree on the nature of the underlying
cooperation problem, in line with the diagnostic element of the frame in
question; alternative ways to understand the problem are not considered.
On that basis, the range of potential institutional choices that is being
considered is narrow; there is little controversy over the general direction
of required institutional choice, which allows for relatively smooth
decision-making. Epistemic networks linked to the originating organiza-
tion and/or culturally legitimated theorists more generally are involved in
institutional debate.
3. Outcome: The resulting institutional choice reﬂects the frame’s prog-
nostic element, often worded in language very similar to that used in the
originating organization. To outside observers, the decision might appear
surprising in view of member states’ divergent structural positions.
Illustrative empirics: institutional choice and the diffusion of the common
market frame
In this section, drawing on interviews, primary documents, and secondary
sources, I seek to demonstrate the plausibility of the frame diffusion argument
with reference to economic cooperation in ASEAN, the Southern Cone/
Mercosur, and SADC. I focus primarily on those key institutional choices
when the three regional organizations decided to move beyond a simple FTA
to embrace a common market, in line with the main puzzle outlined before.
Transformative choices involving the adoption of an FTA will be dealt with
only brieﬂy. In line with the theoretical argument, the narratives show that the
adoption of the common market frame correlates temporally with (1) an
explicit turn towards community building as a major purpose of the organi-
zation and (2) the emergence of cooperation problems that had been theorized
by a given problem–response schema. More broadly, the narratives indicate
how the inﬂuence of the common market frame in regional decision-making
guided actors across different structural contexts towards the adoption of
similar objectives in the process of regional economic cooperation.
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However, an important caveat is that the empirics that follow are indi-
cative, not deﬁnitive. A more rigorous test would not only have to present
more thorough empirical evidence and engage more systematically with
potential alternative explanations; it would also have to leverage more
carefully cross-sectional variation in the types of organizations chosen. In
the current empirics, all of the variance is temporal, and the analyzed
organizations all eventually adopt a common market. I consider the three
organizations in turn, starting with Mercosur and its predecessor in the
Southern Cone.
Southern Cone/Mercosur
Origin and early steps in economic cooperation: Mercosur has its roots in
the gradual rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil that started in the
late 1970s during these countries’ transitions to democracy. In the early
1980s, cooperation was focused on security issues, involving the coordi-
nation of nuclear energy programs, and some limited commercial accords
concerning double taxation and mutual investment. In 1986, the two
governments concluded a program of cooperation that sought voluntary
and gradual trade liberalization on a sectoral basis. This Economic
Cooperation and Integration Program was modeled on the European Coal
and Steel Community in an attempt to help Argentina and Brazil overcome
their long-standing rivalries (Botto 2009, 176). Thus, it was from the early
days of cooperation in the Southern Cone that the original common market
frame guided decision-making. Policymakers in Argentina and Brazil
perceived their situation as akin to the security dilemma between France
and Germany after the Second World War, which led them to adopt a
similar strategy of cooperation that started with functional cooperation and
was to gradually deepen over time (Oelsner and Vion 2011). After only a
few years of actual cooperation, policymakers repeatedly expressed their
belief that ‘the achievement of the common market was a dream for both
countries’ (cited in Gardini 2010, 82).13
Soon thereafter, in November 1988, Argentina and Brazil signed the
Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development, which aimed to
create a free trade area within 10 years through the gradual removal of
tariff and non-tariff barriers on goods and services. Even though it fell short
of establishing a common market, the treaty explicitly laid the foundations
for its adoption in the future. It mentions the creation of a ‘commonmarket’
as a long-term ambition (Art. 5), and envisions the harmonization of a
13 The commonmarket idea has a long pedigree in Latin America, dating back to the creation
of the Latin American Free Trade Association in 1960 when ambitious forms of regional
economic cooperation came to be seen as a solution to the problem of under-development.
Frame diffusion and institutional choice 53
series of ﬂanking policies such as agriculture and transport as well as the
coordination of monetary, ﬁscal, and exchange rate policies (Arts. 3 and 4)
and the gradual harmonization of policies ‘related to human resources’
(Art. 5). In fact, negotiation histories show that even a common external
tariff was provided for in draft treaty texts, but later eliminated for practical
reasons (Gardini 2010, 82).
Yet, the long-term ambition to create a common market only became a
reality three years later with the foundation of Mercosur. How did this
more ambitious form of regional economic cooperation become possible in
such a short period of time?
Adoption of a common market: As noted, the original common market
frame was widely held among policymakers in the Southern Cone, and it
guided decision-making on several occasions throughout the 1980s.
Policymakers in the region saw themselves as being involved in a process of
community building, in which economic cooperation was not seen as an
end in itself, but an important means towards overcoming the historical
rivalry between Argentina and Brazil. Even policymakers who, during their
time in ofﬁce, primarily emphasized the market-building aspect of the
relationship, such as Argentinean President Carlos Menem, perceived these
advances in economic cooperation as an integral part of – as he himself
termed it – a ‘community building process’ (Menem 1996). Policymakers
who were involved in the negotiation of Mercosur expressed similar con-
victions, such as former Argentinean policymaker Roberto Bouzas: ‘there
was a predominant sense of identiﬁcation with the EU “community”
approach to economic integration, as opposed to the more “market-
oriented”models of NAFTA and the FTAA’ (2003, 15–16). This statement
is ‘smoking gun’-type evidence to suggest that certain types of frames have
afﬁnities with speciﬁc organizational purposes, in this case the afﬁnity
between the common market frame and regional organizations directed
at community building. In fact, the Treaty of Asunción, which founded
Mercosur in 1991, codiﬁed this community building purpose by
‘reafﬁrming their political will to lay the bases for ever closer Union
between their peoples’ (Preamble). So what is the evidence that the common
market frame actually guided policymakers during the negotiations?
As noted, the original common market frame had been present
throughout the 1980s, but it was increasingly dominated by the new com-
mon market frame in the run-up to Mercosur. At that point, the economic
cooperation processes in Europe and North America had started to con-
solidate, and they instilled a sensibility among policymakers in the region
that international competition was heightening. Early studies warned of the
potential for trade and investment diversion away from Latin America due
to those developments (see, e.g., Hufbauer 1990), and in June of 1990
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Mexican President Salinas formally requested to join the Canada–US Free
Trade Agreement. Strikingly, it was in the following month, in July 1990,
that Menem and Collor signed the Act of Buenos Aires, envisaging the
creation of a common market. Thus, the timing of renewed attention to
institutional choice in the Southern Cone closely tracks decisions by
important trade and investment partners in Europe andNorth America that
epitomized heightened international competition.
The process of subsequent debate and negotiation reﬂected the new
common market frame and displayed analogical reasoning especially with
the EU’s recent experience. To many decision-makers in the region, the EU
with its 1992 project appeared ‘stronger and more radiant than ever, and
much less dependent on the outside world’ (Vasconcelos 2007, 167).
Relatedly, justiﬁcations for the initiative emulated much of the rhetoric of
the EU’s 1992 program. Argentinean President Menem declared that
Mercosur allows ‘the possibility of uniting [its member countries’ efforts] to
compete in a new global market in which the strength of the trade bloc has
becomemore important than that of individual countries’ (cited inManzetti
1993, 110–11). Similarly, other policymakers viewed ambitious regional
market building as ‘an assertive instrument of competitiveness’ (cited in
Gardini 2010, 87). Interviews also indicate that frame-based decision-
making guided negotiations, and ultimately facilitated consensus for-
mation. Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia recalls of
the negotiations, for example, that ‘reference to the EU was constant’
(interview with the author), suggesting that it provided the relevant focal
point in the negotiations that facilitated consensus formation. In line with a
frame diffusion argument, interviews also indicate that there was no debate
about potential alternative institutional choices, and also little controversy
over the general direction of envisaged institutional choice. One policy-
maker recalled: ‘If we go to the documents or to the minutes of the discus-
sions between Brazil and Argentina, nowhere can you ﬁnd a very detailed
study concerning the technicalities of a customs union or a common
market. You just have political enthusiasm’ (interview with Brazilian
negotiator; see also Botto 2009, 176). Another interviewee mentioned,
along similar lines: ‘We wanted to set the four countries on a path of
regional integration, but we had little experience in how to do that … We
had good intentions, but lacked the knowledge on many speciﬁc issues’
(interview with Argentinean negotiator).
Thus, the ﬁnal outcome of this process was the adoption of a common
market, including a customs union. Treaty language in the Mercosur
agreement draws heavily on that used in Europe. It formulates the ambition
to ensure the ‘free circulation of goods, services and factors of production’
by pursuing the ‘elimination of customs rights and non-tariff barriers,’ the
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establishment of a common external tariff and the ‘adoption of a common
commercial policy,’ as well as the ‘coordination of macroeconomic and
sectoral policies’ (Art. 1). Even more speciﬁcally, it outlines a replication
of the ‘classical’ European integration experience of economic integration
as a step-wise process evolving from an FTA through the establishment
of a customs union towards a common market, as economists such as
Bela Balassa and others had theorized it. In retrospect, some policymakers,
such as former Brazilian Foreign Minister Lampreia, mentioned that
‘it was a mistake to copy the EU integration model’ (interview with the
author).
In sum, due to their community building ambition and thus their reliance
on the common market frame, policymakers in Mercosur addressed chal-
lenges of international competitiveness with the adoption of a common
market and customs union. Faced with the same cooperation challenge,
policymakers in ASEAN initially reacted differently because they were
guided by a different frame – a situation that changed when they endorsed
community building as a central purpose of the organization, as we will see
in the next section.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Origin and early steps in economic cooperation: ASEAN is a regional
organization in Southeast Asia that was founded in 1967 by ﬁve states
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in an attempt
to withstand communist subversion, both internally and from the outside,
during the Cold War. ASEAN’s early evolution shares some similarities
with cooperation in the Southern Cone in that cooperation was initially
restricted to functional coordination in selected policy areas and eventually
moved towards an FTA with the signing of the ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (AFTA) in January 1992. However, this process was much
slower than in the Southern Cone; it stretched out over 25 years rather than
a decade (for a good overview, see Ravenhill 1995). The impetus for
deepening economic cooperation in the early 1990s was similar to the
Mercosur case, and it occurred as policymakers in the region came to
view advances in economic cooperation in Europe and North America
as an indication of heightened international competition that required
political action (Mattli 1999). Thus, much of the justiﬁcation for the AFTA
initiative revolved around the need to enhance ASEAN’s competitiveness
(see, e.g., ASEAN Summit 1992, 27). Unlike Mercosur, however, the
AFTA decision was largely guided by the FTA frame that conceived of
an FTA as an appropriate response to this challenge (see Naya and
Plummer 1997).
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This difference can be explained by the different purposes pursued by
these two organizations at the time. In Mercosur, governments agreed that
enhanced economic cooperation formed part of a larger community
building process, and was thus not seen purely in functional terms, but this
was not the case in ASEAN. For most governments in the early 1990s,
market building was seen as an end in itself within the context of heightened
international competition, akin to the situation in NAFTA. Even though the
organization reacted to these external challenges, it remained a limited and
largely functionally oriented ‘neighborhood watch group’ (Khoo How San
2000). The most distinctive empirical expression of this difference is the fact
that, whereas in Mercosur governments regularly referred to the EU in
explaining their goals, such references were not only largely absent in
ASEAN, but were actually seen as being inappropriate amongmost ASEAN
governments. Despite some exceptions,14 most governments agreed that
any reference to the EU was to be avoided because, as former Singaporean
Senior Minister Rajaratnam noted, ‘the European Community was never
made by ASEAN’s architects the model for ASEAN regionalism’ (Rieger
1991, 161).
Adoption of a common market: However, the tide started turning in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. Two developments coincided around this time,
which made the adoption of a common market possible.
The ﬁrst one was a more explicit endorsement of community building as
a central purpose of the organization. The reasons for this shift in purpose
were manifold, including the fallout from the 1997/98 Asian ﬁnancial crisis,
which shattered ASEAN’s credibility as a regional leader and an economic
regime. In its wake, important inside and outside actors discredited
ASEAN’s self-understanding for being ‘too state-centric (not sufﬁciently
inclusive of societal voices and interests)’ (Ba 2013, 140). ASEAN leaders
quickly realized that, as Secretary-General Severino (2006, 37) noted, they
had to change the ASEAN in a manner that responded ‘to the needs of the
ASEAN’s people of today’ – a goal that a community building purpose was
more likely to serve. Another reason was the enlargement of ASEAN to
other Southeast Asian states (Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and Myanmar
in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999), which increased the political and
economic diversity in the organization and accepted a major former
enemy – Vietnam – in its midst. Thus, more cohesion was required to
guarantee ASEAN’s continued functioning, and the enlargement rendered
parallels with the European project more compelling. For all of these
14 For example, the Philippine proposal during the debates on AFTA made explicit reference
to the European Community (Severino 2006, 15–16).
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reasons, policymakers re-directed the cooperation process more explicitly
towards community building. The idea was ﬁrst developed in the ASEAN
Vision 2020, adopted by the Heads of State in December 1997, which
formulated the vision of ‘a community of caring societies,’ and formalized
in 2008 in the ASEAN Charter, which spoke of the goal to create an
ASEAN Community.
The second major development was the perception that new competitive
challenges required political action. The timing of the new initiative closely
tracks the realization, in the early 2000s, that the growing economic
strength of China and India required a joint response. As former Secretary-
General Ong Keng Yong noted, ‘In the early 2000s, we realized that China
and India were growing rapidly. In 2000/01, China attracted more than
half of the foreign direct investment to East Asia. We realized that indivi-
dual countries cannot compete with these “economic giants”’ (interview
with the author). Thus, these competitors’ economic growth and growing
international assertiveness was increasingly seen as a threat to the region’s
countries in terms of their attractiveness for foreign direct investment.
What is striking about the situation of ASEAN in the early years of the
newmillennium is that policymakers perceived a problem similar to the one
in the early 1990s – challenges of international competitiveness – but
adopted a different institutional solution in response. A plausible explana-
tion for this difference emphasizes frame-based decision-making in a con-
text in which the main purpose of the organization had evolved.
Empirical evidence for this claim refers primarily to the process by which
the common market came to be adopted. For one, reference to the EU not
only became more widespread, but also appears to have been more accep-
table. As early as 1997, inﬂuential actors such as Malaysian President
Mahathir called for a ‘long-term vision’ of ASEAN and suggested setting
‘our sights to be a single market and an economic union à la the EU’ (Manila
Standard, 16 October 1997). In 2001, the economic ministers commis-
sioned an expert study to identify ways to regain ASEAN’s competitiveness
(ASEAN Economic Ministers 2001, section 12; 2002, section 8, respec-
tively). Conducted by a team of European consultants from McKinsey, the
study recommended a ‘step-change’ in integration (Schwarz and Villinger
2004). According to Ong Keng Yong, the study drew parallels with other
regional integration experiences, especially in Europe and also in North
America, to argue that deeper economic integration provided an appro-
priate response to international challenges of competitiveness (interview
with the author). The secretariat and individual member states also con-
ducted studies during this period that diverged in the speciﬁc recommen-
dations; however, according to an Indonesian policymaker, ‘there was
never any disagreement over the general direction of the policy change that
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was required’ (interview with the author). A central reason for this wide-
spread consensus was that occasional references to the North American
experience appeared out of place because, as an inﬂuential Indonesian
policy advisor noted, ‘NAFTA is a narrow… integration project and [it] is
also not about “community building”’ (Soesastro 2008, 49, emphasis
added). Therefore, the frame that was perceived as being most compatible
with the idea of community building appeared like an ‘obvious’ guide.
At the Summit in 2002, Singaporean Prime Minister Chok Tong Goh
(2002) captured the forming consensus that the ‘general way forward’ lay
in ‘faster and deeper integration,’ and he suggested the formation of an
ASEAN Economic Community, ‘not unlike the European Economic Com-
munity of the 1950s.’ It is striking how policymakers who had previously
rejected any comparisons with the EU, including those from Singapore,
suddenly endorsed them in public. For example, high-ranking diplomats
noted at an expert roundtable in Berlin in 2012 that EU integration was
‘inspiring ASEAN’ (BMBF 2012).
The eventual outcome of this process was the Bali Concord II, adopted in
October 2003, which formulated the ambition to establish an ASEAN
Economic Community as ‘the realisation of the end-goal of economic
integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020’ aimed at establishing
ASEAN as a ‘single market and production base’ (ASEAN Summit 2003,
section B1). The High Level Task Force on economic integration, whose
recommendations were attached to the document, described this goal as
involving the ‘free ﬂow of goods, services, investment, and skilled labor,
and freer ﬂow of capital.’ This recommendation became ofﬁcial policy in
the Vientiane Action Program that was adopted a year later and it has
sparked a ﬂurry of activity in terms of deepening economic cooperation
since then.15
Southern African Development Community
Origin and early steps in economic cooperation: In 1981, nine so-called
Frontline States created the Southern African Development Cooperation
Conference, the direct predecessor to SADC. With the support of inter-
national donors, they sought to coordinate national development plans
across a range of functional sectors in an attempt to lessen dependence on
South Africa’s Apartheid regime (Anglin 1983, 700–08). Akin to both the
Southern Cone countries and ASEAN, economic cooperation initially
15 Establishing a customs union in ASEAN has been discussed at lower technical levels, but it
is politically unfeasible due to the divergent foreign economic policies of its member states.
Whereas countries such as Singapore and Brunei have almost zero tariffs, other members such as
Indonesia still retain high tariff levels in certain industries.
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played a marginal role and remained highly circumscribed throughout the
1980s (for an overview, see Lee 2003, Ch. 3). Thus, for the ﬁrst decade of its
existence, the organization followed the pragmatic approach to regional
cooperation advocated by its founding fathers, who announced that the
‘basis of our co-operation [must be] built on concrete projects and speciﬁc
programmes rather than grandiose schemes …’ (SADCC 1980, 19).
Adoption of a common market: Policymakers abandoned this founding
‘ethos’ in the early 1990s by adopting the ‘grandiose scheme’ of a common
market. Similar to the situation in ASEAN, two developments coincided
around this time, which made movement towards a common market
possible. The ﬁrst development was a shift in the purpose of the organiza-
tion towards an explicit endorsement of community building. There are
several reasons for this change. One is the end of Apartheid in South Africa,
which appeared imminent at the time and triggered a fundamental
rethinking of the raison d’être of the organization. Suddenly, even the
eventual accession of South Africa looked like a possibility (see Lee 2003,
46–47). Another reason is the end of the Cold War and the new demands
that were being placed on organizations around the world to become more
participatory and inclusive; that is, democratic – a goal that a community
oriented purpose was more likely to facilitate. Moreover, the 1991 Abuja
Treaty under the umbrella of the Organization of African Unity sought to
establish an African Economic Community through the creation of
sub-regional economic cooperation schemes that served as its central
pillars. SADC(C) was designated as one of those pillars. The new purpose
was made explicit in the transformation of the organization from the
Southern African Development Coordination Conference to the Develop-
ment Community, which seeks inter alia to ‘strengthen and consolidate the
long-standing historical, social and cultural afﬁnities and links among the
people of the Region’ (Art. 5.1.h, SADC Treaty).
As in the other regions, the timing of institutional choice tracks the
perception of enhanced international competitiveness that was crystallized
in the formation of regional blocs in Europe and North America. There are
plenty of statements by important policymakers establishing this link. For
example, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe noted at the 1989 Sum-
mit: ‘the 1990s also offer new challenges as other sub-regions … move
closer together in their integrative efforts, for example, the European single
market by 1992, and the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement’ (SADCC
Summit Record, August 1989, 21). Thus, cognitive frames imbue the new
challenge with meaning and guide policymakers towards appropriate
solutions. The analogical reasoning that undergirds frame-based decision-
making is nicely reﬂected in a statement by Botswana’s President Quett
Masire, which linked Europe’s challenges in relation to competitiveness,
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addressed by the Single European Act, to the situation in Southern Africa:
‘We understand that the single European Act of 1987 will come into effect
soon… If the Europeans need this kind of economic cooperation, we must
need it even more’ (SADCC Summit Record, July 1988, 33).
The ensuing process of debate quickly linked competitive challenges to
enhanced regional economic cooperation. As a secretariat document in
1991 ﬂatly noted: ‘In the face of the region’s realities, and the current
international tendencies toward the establishment of economic blocks, the
region must accept to transform itself into an economic block similar to the
proposed North American free trade zone or the European Economic
Community’ (SADCC Secretariat 1991, 361). Empirical research on the
decision-making process suggests that there was no debate regarding the
beneﬁts and drawbacks of different institutional choices: ‘policymakers felt
that steps towards regional economic integration were necessary […] in
view of the decisive moves towards regionalism in other parts of the world’
(Lenz 2012, 162–63). Without any serious assessment, the 1991 Council
concluded that the new framework for regional integration must provide
‘for crossborder investment, trade and labor and capital ﬂow across
national boundaries’ (SADCC Council of Ministers 1991, 16), and
Zimbabwean President Mugabe spoke at the Summit of the ‘facilitation of
movement of peoples, goods and services’ and ‘greater cooperation in ﬁscal
and monetary affairs’ (SADCC Summit 1991, 53).
More so than in the other two cases, technical experts from the EU helped
elaborate this institutional choice. According to interviews and the primary
record, they were involved in a series of expert studies that reinforced the
emerging consensus on ambitious regional economic cooperation. Such
groups asserted that a ‘stronger emphasis should be given on [sic] the
objective of achieving economic integration’ (Malima et al. 1991, 375).
They directly assisted in the elaboration of the theme document for the
1992 Consultative Conference, which crafted a justiﬁcation for the emerging
consensus to create a ‘single regional market’ (see SADCC Secretariat 1992,
29). Moreover, an EU-paid European lawyer helped draft the Windhoek
Treaty, which codiﬁed the common market objective (interview with
Stephen Kokerai, former legal advisor to Zimbabwean government).
The ultimate outcomewas the codiﬁcation of the ambition for a common
market in the 1992 Windhoek Treaty. Drawing on language of the Treaty
of Rome, it stipulated the goal as follows: ‘the progressive elimination of
obstacles of the free movement of capital and labor, goods and services, and
of the peoples of the region generally’ (Art 5[2]). It also identiﬁed a list of
policies to be coordinated, which was almost identical with that of the
Treaty of Rome (interview with Stephen Kokerai). Implementation of this
goal was initially slow, but re-appeared on SADC’s agenda with the
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Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which was
adopted in 2003 and also involved the creation of a customs union (for an
account, see Lenz 2012).
Conclusion
This article has analyzed a curious empirical phenomenon: the adoption of
similar institutional choices – common markets – in four structurally
diverse regional organizations (the EU, ASEAN, Southern Cone/Mercosur,
and SADC). It suggested that existing arguments drawn from international
political economy, neofunctionalism, and realism provide important
insights into the general prerequisites for economic cooperation in all of
these regions, but offer no clear predictions regarding its speciﬁc institu-
tional form in the absence of unambiguous economic incentives, strong
interest group pressure, supranational entrepreneurship, and direct impo-
sition. The mechanism of frame diffusion was introduced to explain the
adoption of common markets amidst largely indeterminate incentives for
economic cooperation and in the absence of external imposition.
I argued that the EU commonmarket experience has become theorized as
an abstract problem–response schema, linking a particular understanding
of a cooperation problem to speciﬁc institutional solutions. As policy-
makers in other organizations encountered similar cooperation problems,
analogical reasoning led policymakers to adopt framed institutional solu-
tions, independent of the wider material context in which they were
embedded. Thus, frame diffusion biased institutional choice and resulted in
institutional convergence across structurally diverse contexts at the macro
level. Exploiting some temporal variation in the social purpose of regional
organizations, I also posited that institutional convergence became possible
only when organizations adopted a community building purpose that made
it plausible to draw on a frame that was rooted in the cooperation experi-
ence of an organization with a similar social purpose. In sum, my argument
suggests that the spread of the EU’s common market experience is a func-
tion of (a) its theorization in abstract terms, (b) the appearance of similar
cooperation problems in other regions, and (c) ideational afﬁnities in social
purpose between the EU and other regional organizations.
Taken together, the theoretical account advanced here combines func-
tional and non-functional elements in a coherent manner by using Strang
and Meyer’s (1993) notion of theorization to join work on framing and on
diffusion. In so doing, I have elaborated the cognitive dimension that is
largely implicit in both Strang andMeyer’s work and in prominent work on
diffusion (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006; Shipan and Volden 2008).
The main analytical advantage of this move is to identify important ‘blind
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spots’ of existing treatments of diffusion mechanisms and to show the sig-
niﬁcant conceptual complementarities that exist between them. I elaborate
on this point below and situate the mechanism of frame diffusion vis-à-vis
three other prominent diffusion mechanisms: competition, learning, and
emulation.
Competition emphasizes how externalities generated by policy or
institutional choices in other organizations can lead to interdependent
decision-making (see, e.g., Mattli 1999; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett
2006, 792–95; Shipan and Volden 2008, 842). However, it says little about
the speciﬁc institutional choice that is likely to result. Competition generally
constrains the range of viable institutional choices, but it does not dictate a
speciﬁc choice. In order to offer speciﬁc predictions about outcomes,
competition arguments tend to require auxiliary assumptions, which often
imply cognitive processes that are seldom spelled out; for example, that
organizations perceive the policies or institutions of competitors themselves
favorably. The mechanism of frame diffusion and the competition
mechanism share a functional emphasis on external competitive challenges
as an important ‘demand-side’ condition of diffusion; however, through its
reliance on frames understood as cognitive problem–response schemas,
frame diffusion offers a more explicit account of how such problems lead to
a speciﬁc institutional solution.
Learning highlights the acquisition of new causal beliefs as a result of the
information derived from observing other organizations in an attempt to
solve an exogenous cooperation problem (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett
2006, 795–98; Shipan and Volden 2008). Again, like competition and
frame diffusion, learning has a functional emphasis on cooperation pro-
blems as an important ‘demand-side’ condition of diffusion. In contrast to
competition arguments, the learning mechanism also offers an explicit
account of how policymakers move from recognizing a cooperation pro-
blem to reaching a speciﬁc institutional solution; that is, through a process
of informational updating. However, the learning mechanism rarely
expects institutional convergence as the resulting macro outcome, espe-
cially not in structurally diverse contexts, given the underlying (synoptic)
rationality assumption. The mechanism of frame diffusion, in contrast,
plausibly accounts for institutional convergence in outcomes by empha-
sizing the role of cognitive problem–response schemas, which bound
informational searches.16
Emulation highlights the adoption of external policies or institutions for
reasons of legitimacy and social recognition (Meyer and Rowan 1977;
16 Here, it shares much with the concept of bounded learning (see Meseguer 2006).
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Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, 799–801; Shipan and Volden 2008).
Unlike both competition and learning, it shares with the mechanism of
frame diffusion the idea that non-functional elements of institutions inﬂu-
ence their adoption and, speciﬁcally, that an actor’s self-understanding as
being of a particular type shapes institutional choices. In so doing, it plau-
sibly explains processes of institutional convergence across different struc-
tural contexts (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
However, emulation arguments tend to neglect the ‘demand side’ (apart
from the need for legitimacy, which is regularly treated as a constant) and
they are weaker at explaining which institutions are emulated in situations
of institutional choice. These limitations are partly a function of the lack of
(cognitive) micro-foundations that explain how legitimacy concerns actu-
ally translate into institutional decisions (see also Lenz and Viola 2017).
Frame diffusion, in contrast, explicates how processes of theorization shape
policymaker’s choice among alternative frames.
In sum, the mechanism of frame diffusion emphasizes the ‘channeled’
nature of decision-making, which is also being increasingly recognized in
work on diffusion (and elsewhere) that relies on the assumption of bounded
rationality. However, these works tend to pitch their theoretical arguments
as alternatives to existing diffusion mechanisms (Weyland 2005; Poulsen
2014). The frame diffusion argument suggests, instead, that signiﬁcant
conceptual complementarities exist between the mechanisms and that they
regularly blend in the real world. This insight could explain why there is so
much confusion regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of
different diffusion mechanisms (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016). The following
sequence probably captures a real-world decision-making process – at least,
one concerned with economic issues – rather well: competitive challenges
(competition) initiate a (bounded) search for appropriate solutions (learn-
ing), one of which is ultimately adopted in the absence of a thorough cost-
beneﬁt calculation and without due regard to local contexts (emulation).
The advantage of the mechanism of frame diffusion is that it captures this
sequence in a single coherent framework and on the basis of an experi-
mentally veriﬁed set of cognitive micro-foundations that are clearly
articulated. Thus, it promotes a focus on conceptual complementarities,
rather than opposites, between different theoretical approaches.
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